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Barbara von Tigerstrom* A Consumer Protection Perspective
on Regulation for Healthier Eating
This article explores the potential for a consumer protection perspective to
complement public health approaches in designing and justifying laws that aim
to promote healthier eating, such as food labelling regulations or restrictions on
marketing and advertising. Consumer protection and public health are distinct
perspectives, but they share the goal of protecting health and both accept the
need for regulation to protect important interests. Consumer protection objectives
could be used to defend public health measures that are challenged as infringing
rights or restricting trade. Insights from consumer law and scholarship could also
contribute to discussions about when regulatory intervention to promote healthier
eating is justified and the form that intervention should take. Since those working
in public health and consumer protection have been engaged in similar debates,
they have much to learn from each other and may be able to support each other
in pursuit of common goals.
L'auteure explore la possibilit6 qu'une perspective de protection des
consommateurs vienne s'ajouter aux approches en matiere de sant6 publique
pour ce qui est d'6laborer et de justifier des lois qui visent a promouvoir une
alimentation plus saine, par exemple des reglements sur I'6tiquetage des denrdes
alimentaires ou des restrictions sur le marketing et la publicit6. La protection des
consommateurs et la sant6 publique sont des spheres distinctes, mais elles ont
un objectif commun, protdger la sant6, et les deux reconnaissent la ndcessit6
d'une rdglementation pour protdger les intbr~ts importants. Les objectifs de la
protection des consommateurs pourraient 6tre utilisds pour ddfendre des mesures
de sant6 publique contestdes comme portant atteinte aux droits ou restreignant
le commerce. Les enseignements du droit de la consommation et de I'6rudition
pourraient aussi enrichir les discussions sur le moment ou une intervention
rdglementaire visant a promouvoir une alimentation plus saine est justifide et
sur la forme que cette intervention devrait prendre. Puisque les travailleurs des
domaines de la sant6 publique et de la protection des consommateurs ont 6t6
engages dans des ddbats similaires, ils ont beaucoup a apprendre les uns des
autres. Ils pourraient aussi 6tre en mesure de s'appuyer mutuellement dans la
poursuite d'objectifs communs.
* Professor, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan. The author gratefully acknowledges
research assistance by Anita Yuk (University of Saskatchewan JD candidate 20 17) and useful comments
from colleagues at the National Health Law Conference and at the University of Saskatchewan.
472 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Introduction
I. Consumer protection and public health
1. What is consumer protection?
2. Comparing public health and consumer protection approaches
II. Potential contributions of consumer protection law
1. Using consumer protection law in support of public health
objectives
2. Consumer protection objectives as alternative justifications for
regulation
III. Implications for the future of regulation
1. Deciding when to intervene
2. Deciding how to intervene
Conclusion
Introduction
In recent years a range of proposals and new laws have targeted food
products in an attempt to mitigate the public health impact of obesity
and diet-related chronic diseases. These include reforms to food labelling
regulations that would change the way information is presented or extend
nutrition disclosure requirements to restaurant foods. Restrictions on
marketing and advertising are also promoted as a way of reducing the
consumption of unhealthy foods, such as those high in sugar, fat, or
sodium. Another potential strategy is to manipulate the price of various
foods through special taxes or subsidies, aiming to encourage people to
buy less of unhealthy and more of healthier foods and beverages.
All these measures are controversial in that they impose costs or
restrictions on both industry and individuals, and their effectiveness in
improving health outcomes is very difficult to prove. Proposed measures
are often attacked as paternalistic, while supporters counter that industry
practices are already distorting the environment to such an extent that it
is not accurate to portray regulations as interfering with otherwise "free"
choices. Both opponents and supporters make use of various types of
empirical data to either question or emphasize the health risks associated
with certain products and to argue that measures will or will not be
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effective in promoting public health. Important as these debates are, by
focusing narrowly on specific health impacts of proposed measures (for
example, will menu labelling reduce rates of obesity?) they may neglect
other important values, which could be captured by considering broader
consumer protection goals.
The purpose of this article is to explore the potential for a consumer
protection perspective to complement public health approaches in debates
about using law to promote healthier eating. It begins by briefly outlining
the history and meanings of consumer protection and comparing a
consumer-based approach with public health approaches. It then engages
in a critical examination of the ways in which consumer protection
law could contribute to efforts to promote healthier eating. Finally, the
implications for future regulation will be considered, asking what could
be learned from consumer protection law and scholarship in developing
regulations to promote access to healthier food.
I. Consumer protection and public health
1. What is consumer protection?
Defining consumer protection and its boundaries is not an easy task,'
but we can understand consumer protection broadly as referring to "the
extensive accumulation of laws, rules and practice that are ultimately
concerned with the protection of citizens in their economic role as
consumers."2 It focuses on the roles that members of society play as
consumers of goods and services.3 Consumer protection law has a long
history and has developed over the centuries to include a diverse range
of matters, from regulation of weights and measures to standards for
the safety of food and drugs.4 The development of modern consumer
protection law is usually traced back to the thalidomide crisis in the early
1960s, which was the catalyst for significant reforms to pharmaceutical
regulation and drew attention to the inadequacy of existing mechanisms
to address risks to consumers' safety.' In a landmark speech to the U.S.
1. Peter Cartwright, Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law: Law, Theory, and Policy in the
UK (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 1.
2. Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Consumer Protection in Canada and the European Union:
A Comparison (Ottawa: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2009), online: <piac.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2014/11/piac report consumer protectionincanada_and_the_europeon union a
comparisioapdf> at 9.
3. Cartwright, supra note 1 at 3.
4. Gillian K Hadfield, Robert Howse & Michael J Trebilcock, "Information-Based Principles for
Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy" (1998) 21 J Consumer Pol'y 131 at 131.
5. Public Interest Advocacy Centre, supra note 2 at 14-18; Ross Cranston, Consumers and the Law
(2nd ed) (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984) at 152-155 [Cranston, Consumers].
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Congress in 1962, John F. Kennedy articulated four fundamental rights of
consumers: the right to safety (including protection of life and health), to be
informed, to choose, and to be heard.6 More recent documents have added
the protection of consumers' economic interests and access to essential
goods and services as important rights or interests to be protected. The
link between consumer protection and fundamental rights of citizens has
become an important feature of consumer protection law, and consumers'
rights have been incorporated into some national constitutions.8In Canada,
the body of consumer protection law includes specific legislation at both
levels of government, as well as a broader collection of laws and policies
that serve consumer protection goals. Each province and territory has a
consumer protection or business practices statute, which includes matters
such as unfair business practices and terms of consumer contracts.9 The
federal Competition Act includes some similar provisions, most notably
prohibitions on false or misleading representations."o In addition, there
is federal legislation regulating consumer product safety," packaging
and labelling of consumer products, 12 food and drugs,1 3 and weights and
measures, among other matters. Specialized legislation and agencies also
regulate specific areas of concern to consumers, such as broadcasting,
telecommunications, 1 6 and financial services. 17 2. Comparing public health
and consumer protection approaches
Public health and consumer protection have evolved as distinct fields of
scholarship and practice with links to different disciplines, which results
6. Public Interest Advocacy Centre, supra note 2 at 18-19; Iris Benihr, EU Consumer Law and
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 2.
7. Public Interest Advocacy Centre, supra note 2 at 13 (quoting a 1975 European Economic
Community document); UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Guidelines
for Consumer Protection (New York: United Nations, 1999), online: <un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/
consumption en.pdf>.
8. See Benihr, supra note 6 at 45-76.
9. E.g., Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, SBC 2004, c 2; Fair Trading Act, RSA
2000, cF-2; Consumer Protection Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 30, SchA; Consumer Protection Act, RSNS
1989, c 92.
10. CompetitionAct, RSC 1985, c C-34, s 74.01.
11. Canada Consumer Product Safety Act, SC 2010, c 21.
12. Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, RSC 1985, c C-38.
13. Food and DrugsAct, RSC 1985, c F-27.
14. Weights and Measures Act, RSC 1985, c W-6.
15. Broadcasting Act, SC 1991, c 11 and its regulations, administered by the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).
16. Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c 38 and its regulations, also administered by the CRTC.
17. At the federal level, e.g. Bank Act, SC 1991, c 46; Financial Consumer Agency ofCanadaAct,
SC 2001, c 9. At the provincial level, e.g. Financial InstitutionsAct, RSBC 1996, c 141; Payday Loans
Act, 2008, SO 2008, c 9; Disclosure of the Cost of Consumer Credit Regulation, BC Reg 273/2004;
The Cost of Credit Disclosure Act, 2002, SS 2002, c C-41.01.
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in some differences in their approaches. However, there are significant
areas of commonality between public health and consumer protection,
including, most obviously, their shared goal of protecting health and
safety. Both can be seen as helping to protect and promote the right to
health, albeit in different ways." Whereas health protection and promotion
is the primary objective of public health, consumer protection addresses
a broader range of objectives, although some of these, such as protecting
consumers' economic interests or rights to information and choice,
can indirectly protect health. This means that, for example, providing
information to consumers would be more likely to be viewed in public
health as a means to an end (allowing or encouraging healthier behaviour),
while it could be seen as both a means and an end in itself in consumer
protection, given that the right to be informed is considered a basic right
or interest of consumers. Public health initiatives are also more likely to
try to encourage particular choices-those that best protect or promote
health-whereas consumer protection laws have traditionally been more
neutral, aiming to ensure that consumers are able to make choices that
match their preferences, without "making normative judgments about
what it is that consumers should want." 1 9Efforts to further these objectives
have landed both public health and consumer protection squarely in the
middle of debates about government intervention. Calls for regulation by
public health and consumer advocates reveal a shared skepticism about the
ability of free market approaches to adequately protect important interests.
Regulatory measures in both areas have been criticized as paternalistic, so
they have been equally involved in debates about when the government is
justified in limiting people's free choices in order to protect their health
or other interests. More recently, scholars in both fields have shared
an interest in the implications of research in cognitive psychology and
behavioural economics, seeking to better understand how people process
information and make decisions. Since those working in public health and
consumer protection have been engaged in debating similar issues, they
have much to learn from each other and may be able to support each other
in pursuit of common goals.
II. Potential contributions of consumer protection law
There are sufficient potential synergies between public health and consumer
protection that it seems to be worth exploring the contribution that a more
explicit focus on consumer protection might make, bearing in mind the
18. On consumer protection and the right to health, see Benihr, supra note 6 at 49-50, 74.
19. Hadfield, Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 4 at 132.
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limitations of this approach. This section will discuss some ways in which
the use of existing legal frameworks for consumer protection and reference
to consumer protection objectives could help to support the pursuit of
public health objectives relating to healthy eating. The following section
will then explore ways in which we could draw on consumer protection
law and scholarship to inform debates about the future directions of food
regulation.
1. Using consumer protection law in support ofpublic health objectives
Several commentators have considered the potential for legal action
against allegedly deceptive marketing as a means of addressing concerns
about food labelling and advertising.2 0 Existing federal and provincial/
territorial legislation in Canada prohibits consumer products, including
food and beverage products, from being marketed in ways that are false,
misleading, or deceptive.2 1 The Supreme Court of Canada has articulated
a fairly liberal test to be applied in this context: whether a representation
is deceptive is to be determined by the general impression on first contact
on the average consumer, who is credulous and inexperienced, taking
into account not only the text itself but how it is displayed.2 2 Using this
approach, a representation could be found to be deceptive even if it
contains information that is literally accurate and the truth of the claims
could be determined by a careful reading.2 3 So, for example, one could
argue that a food advertisement or label is deceptive if it creates a general
impression that the product is healthy, even if a diligent consumer could
discover its actual nutritional characteristics by looking carefully at other
information such as nutrition facts or ingredients. However, it is still
necessary to establish that the general impression is not one that matches
reality,2 4 which may be difficult when the claim is a relative or subjective
one, such as a food's being "healthy."
20. See, e.g., Jennifer L Pomeranz, "Litigation to Address Misleading Food claims and the Role of
the State Attorneys General" (2013-14) 26 Regent U L Rev 421; Lainie Rutkow et al, "Legal Action
Against Health Claims on Foods and Beverages Marketed to Youth" (2015) 105 Am J Public Health
450.
21. E.g., Food and Drugs Act, supra note 13, c F-27, s 5; Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act,
supra note 12, s 7; Competition Act, supra note 10, ss 52, 74.01; Business Practices and Consumer
Protection Act, supra note 9, ss 4-5; Fair Trading Act, supra note 9, s 6(4); Consumer ProtectionAct,
2002, supra note 9, ss 14, 17.
22. Richard v Time Inc, 2012 SCC 8 at paras 57, 72, 78, 1 SCR 265. This characterization of the
consumer has been adopted, with slight modification, in the context of Competition Act proceedings:
Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v Chatr Wireless Inc, 2013 ONSC 5315 at paras 126-132, 288
CRR (2d) 297.
23. Richard v Time Inc, supra note 22 at paras 55-58.
24. Ibid at para 78.
A Consumer Protection Perspective on Regulation 477
for Healthier Eating
There are several different enforcement mechanisms that could be
used against false, misleading, or deceptive representations. The federal
Commissioner of Competition can refer these matters to a court or the
Competition Tribunal,2 5 and in some circumstances, they can be prosecuted
under federal or provincial legislation.2 6 This legislation also provides
for a right of action by or on behalf of consumers who have suffered
loss or damage as a result of such practices.2 7 In theory, this could be a
powerful mechanism for enforcement; in practice, potential plaintiffs have
encountered a number of obstacles in attempting to bring claims that could
have addressed health concerns about the marketing of food and beverage
products. Three recent attempts to bring class proceedings for deceptive
marketing of beverages (two involving "Vitaminwater," allegedly
marketed as healthy despite its sugar content,28 and one involving a line
of soft drinks marketed as low sodium 29 ) illustrate some of the challenges
plaintiffs face. All were dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to support
the claims, for example evidence that the plaintiff (or other purchasers) had
suffered any damage3 0 or that the representations were false.3 1 A number
of commentators have noted the legal, procedural, and practical hurdles
that confront litigants attempting to assert consumers' rights.3 2 In addition,
recent decades have witnessed a reduction in enforcement activities by
relevant government agencies.3 3 Enforcement of consumer protection laws
therefore holds some promise as a strategy to further public health goals in
relation to healthy food, but faces significant limitations.
2. Consumer protection objectives as alternative justifications for
regulation
Consumer protection is recognized as a valid objective in national
and international law. Where the goals of public health and consumer
25. Competition Act, supra note 10, ss74.01.
26. E.g., ibid, s 52; Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 9, s 189; Fair
Trading Act, supra note 9, s 161; Consumer Protection Act, 2002, supra note 9, s 116.
27. E.g., Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 9, s 171; Fair Trading Act,
supra note 9, ss 13-15.
28. Clark v Energy Brands Inc (cob Glaceau), 2014 BCSC 1891, 72 BCLR (5th) 383 [Clark];
Wilkinson v Coca-Cola Ltd, 2014 QCCS 2631, QJ No 5680 [Wilkinson].
29. SandoffvLoblaw Cos, 2015 SKQB 345, SJNo 589 [Sandoff].
30. Ibid at paras 41, 49, 51; Wilkinson, supra note 28 at paras 76-81; Clark, supra note 28 at para
113.
31. Wilkinson, supra note 28 at paras 44, 47, 51; Sandoff supra note 29 at paras 41, 46, 49, 51.
32. AJ Duggan, "Consumer Redress and the Legal System" in AJ Duggan & LW Darvall, eds,
Consumer Protection Law and Theory (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1980) 200; Jasminka Kalajdzic,
"Consumer (In)justice: Reflections on Canadian Consumer Class Actions" (2010) 50 Can Bus L J 356;
Pomeranz, supra note 20 at 435-437.
33. Jacob Ziegel, "Canadian Consumer Law and Policy 40 Years Later: A Mixed Report Card"
(2010) 50 Can Bus L J 259 at 261, 264.
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protection overlap, it may therefore be possible to use consumer protection
as an alternative justification for measures that are believed to be useful
for public health but for which the evidence of health impact is weak or
equivocal.
A number of measures that are used or proposed to promote healthier
eating are vulnerable to challenges under the Canadian Charter ofRights
and Freedoms3 4 (particularly advertising and labelling regulations that
interfere with freedom of expression) or trade agreements. The public
health goals underlying these measures are compelling and likely to be
accepted as legitimate objectives under the Charter3 5 and trade agreements
like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 36 and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).3 7 However,
if the evidence supporting the potential health impact of these measures is
weak, there is a significant risk that they will be found not to be justified
notwithstanding their valid objectives. For example, if the evidence base
for a measure is weak it may be difficult to justify choosing that measure
over another that impairs rights or restricts trade less, leading the decision
maker to conclude that it is not a minimal impairment (under the Charter)
or that it restricts trade more than necessary.3 8Where public health
measures also serve consumer protection objectives, this can provide
governments with an alternative basis on which to support these measures
if they are challenged. Preventing the deception of consumers has been
recognized by Canadian courts as a pressing and substantial objective that
could justify limiting freedom of expression under the Charter.3 9 It is also
among the objectives that can be invoked to justify restrictions on trade. 40
Consumer protection, and specifically ensuring that consumers receive
information that is accurate and not misleading, has been recognized as a
legitimate objective in several disputes about food standards and labelling
34. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
35. RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 SCR 199 at paras 61, 144-146;
Canada (Attorney General) vJTI-Macdonald Corp, 2007 SCC 30 at para 38, 2 SCR 610.
36. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 58 UNTS 187], art XX(d) (entered
into force 1 January 1948) [GATT 1947].
37. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, 1868 UNTS 120, art 2.2 (entered into
force 1 January 1995) [TBTAgreement].
38. E.g., TBTAgreement, supra note 37, art 2.2.
39. Rocket v Royal College ofDental Surgeons ofOntario, [1990] 2 SCR 232 at paras 36-38; Bratt
v British Columbia Veterinary Medical Assn (1999), 19 Admin LR (3d) 81 at para 73-74, [1999] BCJ
No 2442;Assiev Institute ofCharteredAccountants ofSaskatchewan, 2001 SKQB 396 at para 35, 210
Sask R 16; Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v Chatr Wireless Inc, 2013 ONSC 5315 at para
492, 288 CRR (2d) 297.
40. E.g., GATT 1947, supra note 36, art XX(d); TBTAgreement, supra note 37, art 2.2.
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decided under the TBTAgreement. This is no guarantee that the measures
can be successfully defended, since it still has to be determined that the
restriction of rights or of international trade is justified in pursuit of that
objective. However, the evidence and arguments supporting a consumer
protection justification will be distinct from those for public health, so
having alternative bases for a measure will increase the likelihood that it
can be defended, and it could be important to fully articulate and support
both objectives. This strategy will be most useful where the measure (e.g.,
regulation of marketing or labelling) helps to inform or prevent deception
of consumers, which has been recognized specifically as a valid objective,
and potentially also where it furthers other consumer protection objectives,
which could be argued on a case by case basis.
III. Implications for the future of regulation
Looking forward, insights from consumer protection law and scholarship
could inform discussions of the future development of regulatory
strategies to promote healthier eating. Specifically, they could contribute
to discussions about when regulatory intervention is justified, and then
about the form that intervention should take.
1. Deciding when to intervene
As noted, both public health and consumer protection have been deeply
engaged in similar debates about justifying government intervention,
particularly given that intervention will impose burdens and restrictions on
suppliers, consumers, or both. We could draw insights from the work that
has been done on this question from a consumer protection perspective to
help in determining when and how intervention for public health purposes
can be justified. Reference to consumer protection objectives might also
help with difficult decisions about when to move forward in face of
uncertain evidence and competing priorities.
One of the central preoccupations of consumer protection scholarship
has been questioning the assumptions and policy prescriptions of free
market economists. Based on classical economic theory, a free market
approach would suggest that consumers' preferences are revealed in the
choices they make, and if the market is left to operate freely suppliers will
respond to those choices by offering goods and services that consumers
41. European Communities-Trade Description ofSardines (Complaint by Peru) (2002) WTO Doc
WT/DS23 1/AB/R (Appellate Body Report); United States-Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (Complaint by Mexico) (2012) WTO Doc WT/
DS381/AB/R (Appellate Body Report); United States-Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements (Complaint by Canada and Mexico) (2012) WTO Doc WT/DS384/AB/R (Appellate
Body Report).
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want.4 2 So, for example, if people really do want to eat a healthy diet,
they will make purchasing decisions accordingly, and food producers
and sellers will respond by offering goods that meet those preferences.
If this is true, government intervention could be seen as unnecessary and
even potentially harmful.4 3 Virtually every form of consumer protection
regulation challenges this free market approach, requiring its proponents
to explain why such regulation is justified. Some of the answers can be
found within economic theory itself the assumptions of the free market
economists only hold true in a perfectly competitive market, not where
some form of market failure is present, so market failure can provide a
justification for regulation. 4 One form of market failure is the existence
of a monopoly or other concentration of market power, so competition
law is often associated with consumer protection." Another is information
deficits or asymmetry, where consumers cannot choose according to
their preferences because it is difficult or impossible for them to inform
themselves adequately. A third form of market failure is the presence of
externalities, that is, where the full cost of the activity is not bome by
those who are engaged in it, but by some other person or by society. Where
one or more of these market failures exists, some form of government
intervention can be justified, either to directly address the source of the
failure or to mitigate its consequences.
Obviously consumer protection is not the only area in which
economic analysis is used to inform discussions about regulation,4 6 but
analysis that attempts to identify and correct market failures that have
a particular impact on consumers' rights to health, information, and
choice could be highly relevant in the context of food regulation. Food
consumption fits most of the criteria for the type of consumer decision
where intervention may be justified: when the purchases are small, so
that each individual consumer has little incentive to seek redress, though
the aggregate consequences may be substantial;" when the adverse
consequences of inadequate information are serious or irreversible;" and
42. See, e.g., Cartwright, supra note 1 at 34; Cranston, Consumers, supra note 5 at 21-22.
43. Cartwright, supra note 1 at 6; Cranston, Consumers, supra note 5 at 22-23.
44. Cartwright, supra note 1 at 18-27; Peter D Lunn, "Are Consumer Decision-Making Phenomena
a Fourth Market Failure?" (2015) 38 J Consumer Pol'y 315 at 316, 318-319; Cranston, Consumers,
supra note 5 at 23-25.
45. Cranston, Consumers, supra note 5 at 17-19.
46. See, e.g., Cento Veljanovski, "Economic Approaches to Regulation" in Robert Baldwin, Martin
Cave & Martin Lodge, eds, Oxford Handbook ofRegulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
17.
47. Hadfield, Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 4 at 164; Cranston, Consumers, supra note 5 at 25.
48. Hadfield, Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 4 at 164.
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when "there is no obvious reason for consumers to doubt their general
expectation of safety, and so their expectation can easily be exploited." 49
Several recognized forms of market failure would apply in this context.
Information asymmetry is directly applicable to food products. Without
mandated disclosure, it would be extremely difficult for most consumers
to obtain accurate information about the contents and nutritional value of
their food. Even when information is available, the volume and variety
of food purchases made by the average consumer make the burden of
obtaining and processing information overwhelming. The externalities
of unhealthy food products could also provide a strong justification for
various forms of regulation. The burden of disease and economic costs
associated with unhealthy eating are borne to some extent by consumers,
but as long-term consequences, and largely by society. Thus they are
externalized rather than being reflected in the immediate costs to either the
supplier or purchaser.
In addition to using economic analyses developed within consumer
protection, decisions about when to regulate could be informed by
consumer protection objectives. As discussed above, consumer protection
can play a role as a secondary objective to which we could refer in
defending measures intended to promote healthier eating. In developing
future regulations, more explicit reference to consumer protection
objectives may also help policy makers choose and prioritize among
strategies whose public health benefits are uncertain according to current
evidence. It is widely recognized that the evidence base supporting some
proposed measures, such as taxes on unhealthy foods or new food labelling
requirements, is contested and fairly thin. There is general support for
evidence-based public health measures, but given the complexity of
causes and risk factors in chronic disease and obesity, there are intractable
difficulties in predicting effectiveness. This leaves policy makers in the
difficult position of having to wait for more evidence, thereby missing
opportunities to prevent death and disease, or move forward based on
incomplete evidence, risking opposition and unintended consequences."
In the midst of this uncertainty, consumer protection objectives could
inform choices about which strategies to implement. If the public health
benefits of a particular measure are uncertain according to available
evidence, but the measure can also be supported by a strong consumer
49. Ibid at 154.
50. See, e.g., Nicholas Freudenberg et al, "The State of Evaluation Research on Food Policies to
Reduce Obesity and Diabetes Among Adults in the United States, 2000-20 11" (2015) 12 Preventing
Chronic Disease E182 at 2.
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protection rationale (e.g., consumers' rights to information), that
measure could be justified more easily than one that does not seem to
serve any other objective.
Some risks and limitations of this approach should be
acknowledged. The first is that reference to a broader set of objectives
could actually make policy makers' tasks more difficult, particularly
if it becomes necessary to decide which should take priority. Perhaps
more seriously from a public health perspective, an approach that
generally takes a neutral view of consumers' preferences might be
problematic; if consumers do indeed prefer less healthy food (for
example, because other values are more important to them, such as
price or taste), then an approach that aims mostly at ensuring they can
make choices consistent with those preferences may not be particularly
helpful. Finally, it will be necessary to guard against the risk of
consumer protection arguments being co-opted by industry or other
opponents of regulation, who have used "putatively pro-consumer
organizations"" and the rhetoric of personal responsibility to resist
regulation.5 2 2. Deciding how to intervene
Once a decision is made that there is sufficient justification to move
forward with some form of regulation, analysis from a consumer
protection perspective can also be useful in determining what type
of regulatory strategy should be used and how regulations should
be designed. Consumer protection law and policy have dealt with
many questions that parallel debates in public health, such as whether
mandatory disclosure of information will adequately serve people's
needs or when direct regulation of product characteristics is needed.
Remedying information failures has traditionally been a central
role for consumer policy.5 3 Consumer protection law serves as
a countervailing force against suppliers' motivation to withhold
information or provide misleading information." This can take the
form of restrictions (such as prohibiting misleading or deceptive
claims), mandated disclosure of information, or both." Information-
based strategies tend to be the least controversial, even among
51. David M Studdert, Jordan Flanders & Michelle M Mello, "Searching for Public Health
Law's Sweet Spot: The Regulation of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages" (2015) 12 PLoS Medicine
e1001848 at 5.
52. Kelly D Brownell et al, "Personal Responsibility and Obesity: A Constructive Approach to
a Controversial Issue" (2010) 29 Health Affairs 379 at 379-380.
53. Cartwright, supra note 1 at 21.
54. M Neil Browne et al, "Protecting Consumers from Themselves: Consumer Law and the
Vulnerable Consumer" (2015) 63 Drake L Rev 157 at 159.
55. Cartwright, supra note 1 at 48-53.
A Consumer Protection Perspective on Regulation 483
for Healthier Eating
proponents of a free market approach, since they can be linked directly to
information asymmetry as a form of market failure and are consistent with
the classical view of consumers as rational economic actors who make
choices according to their preferences (so long as they are informed).5 6
In order for these strategies to be effective, however, they must be
implemented in a way that will meaningfully promote consumers' rights
to make fully informed choices. A simple example of this, which could
provide an analogy for nutrition disclosure, is unit pricing: proponents
argue that the price per unit (as well as the total price) should be disclosed
to consumers, so that they can easily compare prices across products
and brands. "Consumer protection scholarship has also grappled with
more complex issues, looking at the different needs of various groups
of consumers and making use of research that seeks to understand how
consumers perceive and process information. Increasingly, it is recognized
that simply requiring the disclosure of more information is not sufficient,
and in fact may be counterproductive." Other mechanisms, like warnings,
might be needed where mere disclosure of information is not adequate but
we want to avoid unduly restricting consumers' choices by banning certain
products.5 9 More fundamental questions are raised by research examining
cognitive biases and other behavioural phenomena that call into question
the model of consumers as rational decision makers. Past efforts to identify
particular groups of "vulnerable" consumers, based on age, education, or
income, are nowjoined by the realization that all consumers are vulnerable
given the inherent limits of their ability to process information and resist
manipulation.6 0 The challenges that these insights present for policy
makers are far more fundamental and complex than addressing market
failures.6 1 Efforts to understand how consumer protection policy should
respond to these challenges are highly relevant as public health policy
confronts similar questions.6 2Regulating the provision of information is
the first traditional response to challenges faced by consumers; a second
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is directly regulating the substance of transactions.6 3 Examples of this
can be found in consumer product safety standards and mandatory terms
of consumer contracts, both of which are typical features of modem
consumer protection laws. This type of response is more controversial,
because it restricts freedom of contract to a much greater degree and can
be perceived as paternalistic, since it removes options from consumers for
their own benefit.6 4 However, such measures can sometimes be justified as
a response to market failure, by the need to correct the power imbalance
between suppliers and consumers, orby appealing to community values and
interests.6 5 Where the consequences of consumers making a "bad" choice
are sufficiently serious, mandatory standards and banning products that do
not comply may be seen as the best response.6 6 Growing recognition of
the limits of regulating information disclosure may strengthen the case for
other forms of regulation. If "as a class consumers are systematically unable
to adequately process the information they need to make good decisions,"
the law may need to provide more direct substantive protections instead.6 7
Product bans are more likely to be considered appropriate if "consumers
are unable to consciously accept the risks associated with a product,"6 8
which it now seems might be the norm rather than the exception. All of
these considerations are important for food regulation. In addition, it is
important to recognize the limits of information-based strategies (e.g.,
regulation of food labelling), which provide the greatest benefits to "health-
conscious, wealthier constituents" without addressing the needs of those
who "must select foods based entirely on availability and affordability"
and therefore "derive few, if any, benefits from transparency. "6 9Past
examples could be used as models for potential new regulations in the
food context, although criticisms of these approaches should also be kept
in mind." Historically, prescriptive standards for food products played a
larger role than information disclosure: "legislative policy has reflected
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64. Cartwright, supra note 1 at 32-33. For example, if a consumer might have preferred buying a
slightly less safe or lower quality product because it is cheaper, product standards may remove that
option, for the consumer's own protection.
65. Ibid at 36-37; Cranston, Consumers, supra note 5 at 27-28; Ziegel, supra note 33 at 269-270.
66. Ross Cranston, "Consumer Protection and Economic Theory" in Duggan & Darvall, supra note
32, 243 at 251.
67. Hadfield, Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 4 at 144-145.
68. James G Hodge & Megan Scanlon, "The Legal Anatomy of Product Bans to Protect the Public's
Health" (2014) 23 Annals H L 20 at 30.
69. Andrea Freeman, "Transparency for Food Consumers: Nutrition Labeling and Food Oppression"
(2015) 41 Am J L & Med 315 at 316.
70. See, e.g., Ross Parish, "Consumer Protection and the Ideology of Consumer Protectionists" in
Duggan & Darvall, supra note 32, 229 at 230-234.
A Consumer Protection Perspective on Regulation 485
for Healthier Eating
a belief that the best way to look after the consumer was to control what
goes into certain standard foods rather than leave judgments about the
suitability of ingredients to the consumer.""1 Regulating package size or
weight has been considered an acceptable way of ensuring consumers can
understand price information.7 2 It has also been suggested that there may
be a place for laws to make it easier for vulnerable consumers to access
products that are necessities, including "the creation of new products or
means of supply."7 3 Applying these regulatory strategies to the context of
healthy food would be controversial and face many challenges-not least
of which would be the perennial question of how to evaluate the health
risks of various products and ingredients. However, the fact that these
strategies are considered reasonable in pursuit of other goals suggests
that they ought not to be rejected out of hand as ways to better protect
consumers' health.
Conclusion
This preliminary exploration of potential connections between consumer
protection and public health has identified several ways in which these
connections might be fruitful. In order to make best use of the synergies
between consumer protection and public health, efforts to strengthen
consumer protection laws and their enforcement should be accepted as
a priority that would also benefit public health. Careful attention to the
consumer protection objectives that are served by some food regulation
measures would also allow health and consumer advocates to support each
other's initiatives. The contributions that consumer protection law and
scholarship could make to the future development of regulatory strategies
for healthier eating is a larger project that will require further analysis.
The discussion here is intended to lay the foundation for a research agenda
exploring the ways in which insights from consumer protection could
be used to develop laws and policies enabling access to information and
healthy options for all Canadians.
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